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NOTES AND COMMENTS
of decision in the Fox Film case, that a nondiscriminatory tax on the
-income from copyrights is not a tax upon any governmental function.
More important is the ascendency, though in a restricted measure,
-of the philosophy that powers and immunities, once thought to be
absolute, must be considered with regard to their effect.
Of incidental interest here, is the provision in the North Carolina
Revenue 'Act which imposes a flat rate license tax on persons en-
gaged in the business of selling patent rights.6 Assuming this to
mean patent rights granted by the United States, what is the con-
stitutional status of the tax?7 Both this tax and that involved in
the Fox Film case are privilege taxes, but with the difference that
the flat rate may be more burdensome than a gross receipts levy.
Under the absolute immunity theory of Long v. Rockwood this tax
should have been invalid. Though flat rate taxation often is in-
iquitous, this license, since small in amount, would likely be counte-
m-anced under the Court's present view.
E. M. PERKINS.
Trusts--Distinction Between Dividend and Coupon Funds.
The increasing burden imposed on the courts of adjudicating the
-various conflicting claims of creditors of insolvent corporations pro-
vokes serious inquiry as to the universally recognized distinction be-
tween a fund created to meet bond interest and a similar fund
created to meet declared dividends.1 The repeated efforts of the
I N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §7880 (94). "Every person, firm or cor-
poration engaged in the business of selling or offering for sale any patent right
or formula shall apply in advance and obtain from the Commissioner of Rev-
enue a separate State license for each and every county in this State where
such patent right or formula is to be sold or offered for sale, and shall pay
for each separate license a tax of ten dollars ($10.00). Counties, cities, or
-towns may levy a license tax on the business taxed under this section not in
,excess of the taxes levied by the State."
I A similar tax has been found in every Revenue Act since 1913, but so far
as can be determined it has not been judicially construed in North Carolina.
See, holding like statutes unconstitutional, Commonwealth v. Petty, 96 Ky.
452, 29 S. W. 291 (1895) ; In re Sheffield, 64 Fed. 833 (C. C. Ky. 1894).
'In Re Interborough Consolidated Corporation, 288 Fed. 334 (C. C. A. 2d,
1923) the court said: "There seems to be a fundamental distinction between a
fund set apart for the payment of a dividend and a fund set apart for the
:payment of ordinary indebtedness". In Guidise v. Island Refining Corpora-
tion, 291 Fed. 922 (S. D. N. Y. 1923) Judge Learned Hand declared, "I
.annot conceive any legal distinction between a fund deposited in a bank to
meet a declared dividend and called a 'Dividend Account,' and a similar fund
-deposited to meet coupons and called a 'Coupon Account'. A declared dividend
is universally regarded as a debt, and a coupon is of course no more than a
secured debt. How it can be thought, ceteris paribus, that one account should
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coupon holders to impress a trust character on the former have been
of no avail ;2 whereas similar efforts on the part of the stockholders
as to the latter have invariably been successful.3 It is well to state
at the outset that deposits for a specific purpose are not within the
scope of the present inquiry, 4 for, obviously, the court will declare
even a coupon fund a trust when the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the fund clearly indicate an intention to create a trust.5
The matter which arouses interest is the fact that the courts hold
that a dividend fund is a trust regardless of the circumstances at-
tending its creation.6 As was said in the first of the Interborough
be a trust fund and the other not passes the limit of my discrimination". But
authority bound Judge Hand to hold to the contrary. In an article on Status
of Funds Deposited for the Payment of Interest on Bonds, (1925) 19 ILL. L.
REv. 429, Robert L. Grinell says that "why the creation of a debt plus the
setting apart of the money to pay it should create a trust, while the setting
apart of money to pay a debt already in existence does not, is nowhere made
clear", and adds that both lines of cases are "of too long standing to be
easily upset".
'Williamsport Gas Co. v. Pinkerton, 95 Pa. St. 62 (1880); Adams v.
Hackensack Commission, 44 N. J. L. 638, 43 Am. Rep. 406 (1882); Van
Horn v. Kittitas County, 28 Misc. Rep. 333, 59 N. Y. Supp. 883 (1889);
Staten Island Club v. Trust Co., 41 App. Div. 321, 58 N. Y. Supp. 460 (1899) ;
Noyes v. First National Bank, 180 App. Div. 162, 167 N. Y. Supp. 288 (1917) ;
Guidise v. Island Refining Corp. supra note 1; Re Interborough Consolidated
Corporation, supra note 1; Erb v. Banco di Napoli, 243 N. Y. 45, 152 N. E.
460 (1926); Pike v. Anglo South American Trust Co., 267 Mass. 130, 166
N. E. 553 (1929).
' Le Roy v. Globe Insurance Co., 2 Edw. Ch. 657 (N. Y. 1836); Re Le
Blanc, 14 Hun 8 (N. Y. 1878); Re Interborough Consolidated Corporation,
267 Fed. 914 (S. D. N. Y. 1920); see Jermain v. Lake Shore Ry. Co., 91
N. Y. 483, 492 (1883); Albany Fertilizer Co. v. Arnold, 103 Ga. 145, 148,
29 S. E. 695, 696 (1897); Re Sutherland, 23 F. (2d) 595, 599 (C. C. A.
2d, 1928); Van Dyck v. McQuade, 86 N. Y. 38, 52 (1881).
'For a discussion of deposits for a specific purpose, see (1931) 10 N. C. L.
REv. 381.
'In Rogers Locomotive Works v. Kelly, 88 N. Y. 234 (1882), the cor-
poration deposited money to meet interest coupons under the following written
agreement: "Received of corporation $25,000 in trust, to apply the same to
an equal amount of corporation's coupons in order of presentment, said money
not to be subject to the control of corporation otherwise than for payment of
the said coupons." In Steel Cities Chemical Co. v. Virginia Carolina Chemical
Co., 7 F. (2d) 280 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), the company, under a trust indenture,
transferred to a trust company, as trustee, all its property, to pay as per trust
agreement the interest coupons as they fell due. Judge Hand dissented with
"whatever may be said for the original ground of the doctrine and for any
theoretical distinction between dividends and coupons, it seems to be unfor-
tunate to introduce nice distincti6ns into such a subject, where certainty and
simplicity is the first requirement." In Holland Trust Co. v. Sutherland, 177
N. Y. 327, 69 N. E. 647 (1904), a foreign corporation to secure its bonds
assigned all its property to plaintiff as trustee and by the same trust instru-
ment agreed to set apart certain revenues "to be used exclusively to pay the
interest on bonds and for no other purposes." (Italics ours).
62 CooK, CoapoRAioNs (8th ed. 1923) §541; 7 THomrsoX, CoRpoRIoNs
(3d ed. 1927) §5308; cases cited, supra note 3.
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cases, 7 "the fact that the dividends were declared and set aside dis-
tinguishes it in principle from that class of cases where the trust
fund question depends on the circumstances and sometimes on the
language used when the fund was .created or deposited." It is be-
lieved that the failure to see this distinction has been the source of
all the misunderstanding. 8
Apparently the first case of any importance declaring that a div-
idend fund was a trust for the benefit of the stockholders was Le
Roy v. Globe Insurance Company,9 decided in 1836. There the cor-
poration declared a dividend, debited the amount on the corporation
books, and made out all the dividend checks. The corporation was
declared insolvent before the plaintiff had received his share of the
dividends. The court held that a trust fund had been created in
favor of the stockholders and that the plaintiff could recover in
preference to the general creditors of the corporation. There may
be some doubt as to whether there was a sufficient segregation of the
funds to establish a trust res, since the checks were drawn on the
corporation's general account at the bank,10 but the doctrine of the
case has since been consistently followed and approved."
Neither the language of the Le Roy case nor that of subsequent
cases has been very helpful. But it is clear that in the coupon cases
the courts will not declare a trust unless two elements are present:
(1) a trust regs,12 in the nature of a fund, and (2) an unequivocal
7267 Fed. 914 (S. D. N. Y. 1920) Although declaring the fund a trust as
to the amount necessary to pay the dividends, the court reserved the point as
to the status of money remaining after the dividend claims had been satisfied.
'In Guidise v. Island Refining Corp., supra note 1, Judge Hand says, "what
seems to me of consequence is that each remittance was sent on with the
understanding that the obligor should not have anything more to do with it,
and that the bank should distribute it to those who were entitled. That, I
should think, might have been treated as an irrevocable release of control,
and so, a valid declaration of trust". In Re Interborough Consolidated Cor-
pofation, supra note 2, the court said "we find it impossible to spell out a trust
in favor of the coupon holder, although we admit that we entered upon
consideration of this case inclined to think that a trust relationship existed".
'2 Edw. Ch. 657 (N. Y. 1836).
"In the course of the opinion the court said, "it makes no difference in my
judgment that the money was not told out and specifically set apart in the
bank to meet these checks, or that a separate fund was not created for the
purpose, or that the money intended to meet them still formed a part of the
general mass standing to the credit of the company on the books of the bank".
This language clearly explodes any attempted analogy between coupon funds
and dividend funds on the ground of the particular terms of the contract
with the bank when the deposit is made.
"' Cases cited, supra note 3.
" The trust res is never a prominent question in the coupon cases, for the
6uits always involve an attempt to impress a trust on a specific and designated
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expression of intent to create a trust.' 3 On the other hand, in the
dividend cases the court's inquiry is restricted to the trust res, and if
a sufficient segregation from the general assets of the corporation is
shown, that, ipso facto, gives rise to a trust regardless of what the
intent of the corporation may have been.' 4 Furthermore, when the
fund is not deposited in the bank, the corporation is declared the
trustee.15 The inevitable conclusion is that the distinction is pred-
icated upon a relation between the corporation and its stockholders
which does not exist between the ordinary debtor and creditor.' 6
It has long been established that the proper and authorized dec-
laration of a dividend creates an irrevocable debt due from the cor-
poration to the stockholder, placing the latter in the position of a
general creditor.' 7 But the important thing to notice is the fact that
bank deposit. It becomes important in the dividend cases due to the fact
that quite often the dividend is payible out of a general account at the bank
or is payable at the office of the corporation.
'In Re Interborough Consolidated Corporation, supra note 2, the court
held that "nothing that was said or done amounted to a declaration of trust,
and the relation between the bank and the depositor continued to be that of
debtor and creditor", and that "the bank here was simply the agent of the
bankrupt, agreeing merely to pay the latter's checks when presented. This
agreement created a mere agency, and like all other agencies not coupled with
an interest, was revocable at will and conferred no title or equitable lien on
any third party or coupon holder". Attempts to apply the Lawrence v. Fox
doctrine have generally failed for lack of an express promise, supported by
Consideration, by the bank to pay the coupon holders. Staten Island Club v.
Trust Co.; Erb v. Banco di Napoli, both supra note 2.
" Le Roy v. Globe Insurance Co.; Van Dyck v. McQuade; Jermain v. Ry.
Co.; Re Sutherland, all supra note 3. However, when a dividend is declared
and a fund deposited in the bank, the insolvency of the bank does not cut
off the stockholder's right against the corporation until a reasonable notice
of the deposit has been given. King v. Paterson & Hudson R. Co., 29 N. J.
L. 82 (1860). This is clearly true in the case of coupon funds. Williamsport
Gas Co. v. Pinkerton, supra note 2.
"'Van Dyck v. McQuade; Jermain v. Ry. Co., both supra note 3.
" Note (1928) 28 CoL. "L. RFv. 477.
" The cases agree that a cash dividend which has been declared is not
revocable. Beers v. Bridgeport, Spring Co., 42 Conn. 17 (1875) ; McLaren v.
Crescent Co., infra. One court allowed the directors of a corporation to
"rescind the vote" to pay a dividend where it had been given absolutely no
publicity or, publication. Ford v. East Hampton Rubber Thread Co., 158
Mass. 84, 32 N. E. 1036 (1893). But even this decision was criticized in the
McLaren case, infra. The stockholder whose dividend is declared does not
stand as a preferred creditor until there has been a segregation of the funds
so as to give rise to a trust. Lowne v. American Fire Insurance Co., 6 Paige
482 (N. Y. 1837); Hunt v. O'Shea, 69 N. H. 600, 45 Atl. 480 (1899); Mc-
Lare n v. Crescent Co., 117 Mo. App. 40, 93 S. W. 819 (1906); Staats v.
Biograph Co., 236 Fed. 454 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) ; see Elkins v. First National
Bank, 43 F. (2d) 777, 779 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930). But the language in some
of the cases is to the effect that mere declaration divides the property which
belongs to the corporation into that which the corporation retains and that
which the corporation agrees to pay to the stockholders, or that mere declara-
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the debt is not supported by the usual common law consideration, but
by the peculiar relationship which the corporation bears to the stock-
holder.' 8 It has been said that this relationship is, to all practical
purposes, that of trustee and cestui.19 Although this may not be
technically true, the fact cannot be escaped that the stockholders are,
in a sense, the beneficial owners of the corporate property. That
proposition has been adequately recognized by those cases in which
the court has deemed it desirable to disregard the separate legal en-
tity of the corporation. 20 It would logically follow that the earned
increment from which a dividend is declared is also, in a sense,
beneficially owned by the stockholders.2 1 The formality of declar-
ing a dividend is, in effect, no more than a dissolution of a portion
of the corporate property in favor of the stockholders. And once
that portion is segregated from the mass, it is not a matter of great
difficulty to realize it as a trust fund in their favor.22
In this way there can be found at least a technical distinction be-
tion is, in legal contemplation, a separation of the amount from the assets of
the corporation, which holds such amount thereafter as trustee of the stock-
holder. Staats v. Biograph Co., suprg; Hopper v. Sage, 112 N. Y., 530, 20
N. E. 350, 8 Am. Rep. 771 (1889). But ordinarily, mere declaration does
not entitle the stockholder to sue in equity. Searles v. Gebbie, 115 App. Div.
778, 101 N. Y. Supp. 199 (1906). But see Beers v. Bridgeport, supra at 24.
The person owning the stock when the dividend is declared is the one entitled
to it and not the one owning the stock wfien the dividend is paid. Hopper
v. Sage, supra; Hill v. Newwanawich, 8 Hun 459 (N. Y. 1876).
' As was said in Ford v. East Hampton Rubber Thread Co., supra note 17,
"the doctrine as applicable to simple contracts between persons having no
fiduciary relation to each other is not applicable to the promise of a cor-
poration to pay a dividend. The corporation's purpose is to make money for
its stockholders, and it is the duty of the directors from time to time to
declare dividends out of the net earnings, if there are any. The whole property
of the corporation is held on a sort of trust for the stockholders, and the
directors are, in a sense, managers. The stockholder's cause of action does
not arise from any actual contract between the corporation and the stock-
holder, but from the nature of the organization and the relation of the stock-
-holders to the corporation and its property. The amount after declaration is
considered as property held by the corporation for the use of the stockholders
individually".
"See Moore v. Schoppert, 22 W. Va. 282, 290 (1883).
" First Nat. Bank v. Trebein, 59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E. 834 (1898) ; Rice
v. Sanger Bros., 27 Ariz. 15, 229 Pac. 397 (1924).
"See Re Sutherland, supra note 3, to the effect that a stockholder has a
vested interest in the corporate profits.
I In Re Le Blanc, .upra note 3, and Re Interborough Consolidated Cor-
poration the language is that the stockholders acquired a "lien in equity" on
the fund. But in conformance with the trust idea it has been held that the
corporation cannot be taxed on such fund. Pollard v. First National Bank
47 Kan. 406, 28 Pac. 202 (1891). It would therefore seem to follow that
the fund could not be garnished by a creditor of the rorporation, or be sub-
jected to tort or wage claims against the corporation.
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tween the two funds. But the question remains whether the con-
clusion reached by the courts is justified. As a practical matter the
present-day stockholder is far removed from either ownership or
control of the corporate property. To hold that a dividend fund is
a trust necessitates indulgence in a process of abstract theorizing
which should never be resorted to in the absence of cogent reasons
of public policy. And if public policy is at all involved, it would
seem to favor the creditor of the corporation rather than the stock-
holder. FRANK P. SPRUILL, JR.
Workmen's Compensation-Conflict of Laws--Injury to
Employee Outside State of Employment.
The deceased, a resident of Vermont, was employed in that state
by a Vermont corporation, and was killed while doing temporary
work in New Hampshire. Thd administratrix of deceased, a resi-
dent of New Hampshire, brought suit in that state for the death of
her intestate. The Vermont Compensation Act provides that the
employee's acceptance of the Act bars a recovery in Ia suit at law;
whereas the New Hampshire Act permits the employeeto elect, sub-
sequent to the injury, either to take compensation under the Act or
to sue at law. The Vermont Act also provides that workmen em-
ployed within the state shall be entitled to compensation though in-
jured outside the state. The case was removed to the federal court
on the ground of diversity of citizenship; and defendant interposed
as a defense that the Vermont Act would not permit the action. The
Supreme Court of the United States held the Vermont Act a bar to
the action brought in New Hampshire.'
Where the injury occurs outside the state of employment the con-
fusion among the courts as to what law governs is occasioned by the
conflicting tort and contract theories of workmen's compensation and
the differences among the statutes themselves. 2 The earlier tendency
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper - U. S. - , 52 Sup. Ct. 571,
76 L. ed. 757 (1932).
2 See an excellent article by Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Con-
flict of Laws (1927) 11 MiNN. L. Rv. 329.
In connection with the general problem, see GOODRICH, CNFLICT OF LAWS
(1927) §§202-206; CoNFCT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926)
§§434-443; Angell, Recovery Under Workmen's Compensation Act for Injury
Abroad (1918) 31 HAmv. L. Rzv. 619; (1918) 27 YALx L. J. 113; (1927) 5
TEx. L. Rzv. 416; (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 86; (1930) 16 VA. L. REv.
701; (1925) 10 CoRN. L. Q. 364. On extraterritorial operation of workmen's
compensation acts, see Note (1919) 3 A. L. R. 1351; Note (1929) 59 A. L. R.
735.
